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Lee: Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory

Introduction
Contemporary conflicts have become more transnational, protracted,
irregular, and resistance-centric.1 They can be best described as protracted
internal conflicts with multiple state actors and non-state actors intervening
much like the multidimensional hybrid operational environment discussed in
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022.2
This article aims to explain how to harness the emerging strategic utility of
non-state actors by utilizing well-established bodies of knowledge on
resistance dynamics. This objective is based upon the observation that an
increasing number of external state actors overtly or covertly intervene in
intrastate conflicts by exploiting the environment’s resistance potential in
order to increase their respective strategic influence.3 Similarly, both internal
and external non-state actors take advantage of interstate conflicts or political
instability stemming from failing states. The current conflicts in Iraq and
Syria certainly meet this characterization; as do those in Ukraine, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya. More state actors are supporting or
sponsoring political movements in intrastate conflict, making the termination
of fighting very difficult. For instance, the resilience of the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is largely attributed to the protracted Syrian civil
war in which regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all
sponsor local movements. In addition, external non-state actors such as ISIL,
al-Nusra, and Hezbollah are also deeply involved in the conflict. In other
words, these current conflicts represent a sample of a larger shift in warfare.
As of this writing, Uppsala University’s world conflict data program compiles
40 conflicts in the world for 2014. All but one of them are intrastate conflicts
and 13 of them are internationalized.4 In short, state actors are actively
leveraging and taking advantage of the resistance potential of groups engaged
in civil conflicts.

Understanding Current Conflicts
The United States must adapt to this operational environment in order to
help achieve national policy objectives. Key to this goal is a shared problem
Glenn Johnson & Doowan Lee, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to
Unconventional Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December, 2014.
2 U.S. Army, ARSOF 2022, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 2013, 3.
3 Note that internal conflicts can be a civil war or an internal political confrontation or
both.
4 http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/accessed July 28, 2015.
1
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identification that will lead to mitigation and reduction of the fog and friction
inherent in a hybrid operational environment. Problem identification begins
with understanding how external groups are leveraging and harnessing the
resistance potential of organic movements toward their respective strategic
interests. By understanding how resistance potential is shaped toward
strategic objectives, we can also better determine how to replicate the best
practices of supporting and sponsoring robust organic movements.
In order to fight successfully in this complex hybrid environment, a deep
understanding of resistance dynamics is critical. Without understanding
resistance dynamics, it becomes next to impossible to identify who is working
with adversarial state actors and how their non-state surrogates gain political
support against our own strategic interests. Our recent unsuccessful attempt
at building a surrogate force in Syria is a good reminder of why it matters to
harness the utility of organic resistance. Instead of building a sustainable
movement with an armed wing, we thought a program designed to train and
equip a few dozen commandos would suffice.5 This article intends to delineate
the strategic dynamics of resistance and discuss the utility of resistance as a
strategic tool.
The article begins with a discussion of how resistance is conceptualized in
doctrinal and academic terms to distill the essential characteristics of the
concept. Then I will highlight three aspects of resistance: antecedent
conditions, mechanisms, and effects. I will identify what antecedent
conditions facilitate resistance followed by a variety of mechanisms employed
by movements to exploit the conditions. The discussion of mechanisms
accompanies a description of the effects that can be expected when
movements take advantage of these conditions. The article concludes with a
discussion of some of the essential traits associated with effective resistance
in highly repressive environments.
This article is mostly informed by social movement theory and collective
action theory. Other disciplines also address resistance. However, political
sociology offers the deepest insights into internationalized civil wars and
resistance given its disciplinary focus on revolutionary, resistance, and
insurgent dynamics. The article offers a broad overview of the
multidisciplinary resistance literature as opposed to an in-depth case study of
For a good discussion on why the surrogate force was so ineffective, see David Maxwell,
“Why the New Syrian Army Failed: Washington and Unconventional Warfare, War on the
Rock: http://warontherocks.com/2015/08/why-the-new-syrian-army-failed-washingtonand-unconventional-warfare/ accessed on August 20, 2015.
5
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a single resistance movement. The main purpose is to distill commonly
established and empirically validated patterns and mechanisms of resistance.
The terms “resistance” and “insurgency” interchangeably throughout. Given
how extensively organic movements have been utilized by external actors,
one’s resistance movement is frequently another’s insurgency.6 Pragmatism
guides this article; it aims to learn the best practices from all forms of robust
movements regardless of their political orientation.

What is a Resistance Movement?
In order to harness the utility of resistance, this article begins with some
definitions, both doctrinal and academic. The Department of Defense defines
a resistance movement as “an organized effort by some portion of the civil
population of a country to resist the legally established government or an
occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.”7 In political science
or sociology, resistance is notoriously difficult to define due to its
multidisciplinary nature. It can arguably range from armed guerillas to
symbolic gestures depending on which academic discipline defines it. 8
Because of this diversity, I use a broad academic definition of resistance in
order to avoid a potential bias: “[collective and] active efforts to oppose, fight,
and refuse to cooperate with or submit to … abusive behavior and…control.”9
We can infer three shared characteristics from the definitions: organization,
civilian components, and disruption or coercion against some authority.
Unfortunately, these definitions offer little on how to recognize resistance
potential and leverage it toward a strategic objective. This is where social
movement theory can inform us of the process of resistance. Based on the
political process model developed by Douglas McAdam, we can approach
resistance from three different angles: antecedent conditions, mechanisms,
and effects.10 This is a very useful way to think about resistance as the
synthesis helps us understand what one should include to develop a
For a good large-N statistical analysis of external support for armed groups, see Zeec
Maoz and Belgiin San-Akca, “Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups
(NAGs), 1947-2001, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2012. One of their
findings is that supporting only armed groups tends to prolong and complicate intrastate
conflicts.
7 U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2010
(as amended through 15 June 2015), p. 206.
8 For a detailed discussion how each discipline defines resistance, see Hollandder and
Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance” Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4.
9 Profitt, 1996: 25 from Hollandder and Einonhner, “Conceptualizing Resistance”
Sociological Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4.
10 Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 19301970, University of Chicago Press, 1982.
6
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resistance movement. That is, the United States should understand what
conditions to factor in, what activities to support, and what effects can be
expected toward the end-state.
Figure 1: Social Movement Approach to Resistance Dynamics
Steady State

Mechanisms

Effects

Political
factionalization
Opposition parties

Co-optation and
conversion of
political elites

Elite sponsorship/
Political legitimacy

Ungoverned or
under-regulated
economics

Resource
generation/
Usurpation of
state resources

Self-sufﬁciency/
provision of
services/ Popular
mobilization

Socioethnic divides,
clusters of dissident
social ties and
existing networks

Bloc recruitment
& network
expansion

Organizational &
operational
resiliency

Grievances,
competing identities,
& norms of
collective action

Framing &
messaging through
media platforms

Ideological
legitimacy/
Popular support

End State

Robust Collective Action (C.D.O)

RRI Potential
(Revolutionary, Resistance, Insurgent)

Counter-state Perspective

Antecedent conditions

Reduced RRI
Potential

Structural Risks

State Perspective

Expansion of the political process/ counter sponsor operations
Economic integration & regulation/ counter-illicit ﬁnances
Integration of civil society (“ civic engagement” )/ formation of counter-movements
Strategic communication, multicultural programs/ Counter IO

Figure 1 depicts typical processes in the development of resistance
movements. They are organized in three categories: conditions, mechanisms,
and effects. The utility of these categories is threefold. First, there is much
confusion about what factors promote robust resistance, often conflating what
is available in the environment with what activities should be emphasized.
Second, little discussion exists on what effects external actors can facilitate
with and through surrogate movements. Without understanding recurring
links between conditions, mechanisms, and effects, it is almost impossible to
confidently support resistance elements. Figure 1 clarifies some of the
confusion and suggests what to look for, what to do, and what to achieve to
support a robust resistance movement. The categories represent broad factors
and should not be understood as specific prescriptions.
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Conditions
Antecedent conditions are independent of any other explanatory variable.11
An antecedent condition can be defined as “a phenomenon whose presence
activates or magnifies the action of a causal law or hypothesis.” 12 In essence,
antecedent conditions are locally available ingredients that can be enhanced
or amplified through active mechanisms toward robust resistance. In order to
support resistance then, it is critical that intelligence preparation of the
battlefield begin by analyzing what conditions exist in the operational
environment.
Social movement theory suggests four major types of antecedent conditions:
political, economic, social, and informational. Political conditions can be
factions within the regime or the existence of political opposition groups.
Such political groups might be formal or informal. In addition, nonpolitical
entities can also expand political opportunities for resistance movements. For
instance, Jerzy Popieluszko was instrumental in providing political legitimacy
to the Polish opposition movement and Solidarity. Popieluszko was a Catholic
priest who routinely delivered anti-communist sermons and gave both
religious and nationalist speeches in support of Solidarity. His sermons
mobilized such a broad segment of the Polish population that the regime had
him assassinated in 1984. Ironically his martyrdom immensely expanded
political opportunities for the opposition movement.
Religious leaders creating political opportunities for resistance movements
are not uncommon. Cardinal Jaime Sin of the Philippines was able to turn the
tide in 1986 when the first “people’s power” movement managed to oust
Ferdinand Marcos.13 Marcos ordered his military to crush the opposition
movement supporting Corazon Aquino, widow of the assassinated senator
Benigno Aquino Jr. Cardinal Sin immediately issued a statement urging
Catholics to go out and protect the protesters from the troops who had been
ordered to shoot.14 Similarly, Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador gave a
great deal of political legitimacy to political opposition groups such as the
Democratic Revolutionary Front and the Farabundo Marti National

Henry E. Brady & David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2004, p. 274.
12 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell
University Press, 1997, pp. 9-10.
13 Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic
of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 160-2.
14 Ibid., p. 161.
11
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Liberation Front (FMLN).15 His support for resistance groups opposing the El
Salvadoran regime was so powerful that he too was assassinated. At his
funeral, more than 100,000 mourners gathered demanding both land and
political reforms.16 The FMLN’s guerilla force was still very weak and unable
to mount effective offensives against the government. The army fired on the
mourners, killing dozens. This massacre quickly became a mobilizing
narrative for opposition groups. In fact, the assassination of Romero drove
many sympathizers and nonviolent activists to actively support and join the
FMLN guerrillas.17
Elections provide unique political opportunities for resistance. The overthrow
of Slobodan Milosevic took place right after the rigged presidential election of
2000. Marcos was also overthrown following the 1986 snap election in the
Philippines where the appearance of election fraud was quickly utilized for
mobilization. Cardinal Ricardo Vidal almost immediately made a statement
condemning the apparent election irregularities. Where elections are used as
a tool of political legitimation, resistance potential follows. The key is to
maintain continuously updated information about political events and
elections in countries of interest. Even draconian regimes tend to allow
elections if only to achieve international legitimacy. This provides a unique
opportunity to map the political landscape of the regime.
Certain economic conditions are highly associated with the onset of resistance
movements. However, not all robust resistance movements are attributable to
economic downturns. Typically, conditions often linked with the onset of
resistance include income inequalities, under-employment, unemployment,
inflation, or income stagnation. Note that it is often external shocks that
trigger the exacerbation of these conditions. Economic measures taken by
external actors can create a more conducive environment for organic
resistance.18
Ungoverned or under-regulated economics can also provide opportunities for
resistance groups to generate resources to sustain themselves. These
unsanctioned economic areas typically have built in informal or autonomous
channels of resource extraction and redistribution. The autonomy of the
Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991,
Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 197.
16 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador,
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 26-27.
17 Ibid., p. 105.
18 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special
Warfare Magazine, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2013, p. 30.
15

47
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss4/3
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.4.1647

Lee: Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory

Bazaar in Iran was a major factor during the Iranian revolution of 1979.19 The
Bazaar provided much needed resources to key organizers of the resistance
when the regime cut subsidies and stipends to students and academics.20
Economic conditions themselves are rarely sufficient for resistance to emerge
or to take hold. While economic conditions throughout the Middle East were
generally comparable in the 1980s and 1990s, insurgent movements emerged
in only a few select countries.21 While all major macroeconomic indicators
were comparable in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia between
1980 and 1992, only the first two countries experienced major insurgent
movements. This reflects the explanatory poverty of the classical model of
resistance which links collective action directly to individual psychological
conditions.
Several flawed assumptions explain the limited analytic value of the classical
model.22 First, it is almost impossible to observe and measure individual
psychological conditions in order to see how they may impact resistance,
especially in less than fully developed countries. Second, even if such
conditions were observable, the classical model offers no causal mechanisms
to link the assumed individual psychological disequilibrium with collective
mobilization. It just offers a leap of faith between individual psychology and
collective action. Thus, Fearon and Laitin show with their empirical analysis
of the Minority at Risk dataset that ethnic divides or grievances alone rarely
explain the intensity or duration of civil wars.23 In fact, they provide statistical
evidence that the outbreak of intrastate conflicts cannot be explained by the
strength of political grievances. This is not a trivial finding given how popular
the notion of grievance is in the common understanding of insurgent
dynamics. Third, the antiquated classical theory of insurgency cannot explain
how resistance can take place in developed countries.
Individual grievances do play a role in the development of resistance. The
question is how. Typically, grievances become instrumental when they are
exploited and framed by groups or networks actively seeking to create
Benjamin Smith, “Collective Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in
Iran,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: a Social Movement Theory
Approach, Indiana University Press, 2004, pp. 187-9.
20 Ibid.
21 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 10-16.
22 For an example of how structural strains are inadequately used to explain revolutionary
movements, see Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Stanford University Press,
1966.
23 James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003.
19
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opportunities for collective mobilization. For the special operations forces
(SOF) community to harness resistance potential, then, the focus should be
on both the existing conditions and the activities of political actors. This is in
essence what Emirbayer and Goodwin call the problem of agency, warning of
the false promise of structural determinism.24 In other words, one cannot
properly leverage resistance unless potential (antecedent conditions) is
understood in the context of agency (purposeful activities).
Socioethnic divides and existing dissident networks provide great potential
for resistance. In particular, external actors can leverage such conditions to
establish a robust organizational platform. It is no coincidence that most
robust resistance movements emerge from pre-existing ties and networks.
These pre-existing ties typically have built-in mechanisms to coordinate
information and action across civil society. Ethnic divides can be a powerful
fault-line to promote resistance initially. However, an isolated group can be
an easy target for the regime to marginalize and vilify. The SOF community
must pay attention to what network resources socioethnic groups can
contribute to the creation of broad coalitions of resistance movements as
opposed to just relying on a single subgroup.
Ideological conditions refer to existing grievances stemming from economic
disparities or structural strains such as income inequalities, unemployment,
underemployment, or discrimination. In essence, these conditions often stem
from social, economic, or political strains. They also include existing norms of
collective action and violence that can be utilized to justify mobilizing large
groups for resistance. For instance, a sense of victimization is often used by
Islamists to justify jihad.25 Typically, insurgents will try to align their ideology
with socially accepted themes of dissent.26 Instead of treating resistance
ideology as a monolithic worldview, it is more useful to approach it as a set of
grievances specifically framed to motivate and justify collective action.

Causal Mechanisms and Effects
Mechanisms refer to the causal links between antecedent conditions and
outcome variables. In the social sciences, a causal mechanism is defined as
“physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal
Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of
Agency, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 99, No. 6, 1994.
25 David A. Snow & Scott C. Bryd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist
Movements, Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2006.
26 David A. Snow & et al, “Frame Alignment Processes. Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1986, pp. 467-76.
24
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capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer
energy, information, or matter to other entities.”27 Translated to the concept
of resistance, causal mechanisms are the activities and techniques used by
insurgents or activists to exploit and accelerate the antecedent conditions for
resistance purposes. Effects, then, are the outcomes insurgents intend to
accomplish by exploiting the conditions through a variety of mechanisms.
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) recently released a
concept paper that emphasizes cultivating soldiers “with the knowledge,
skills, and abilities to understand and influence human actions and
activities.”28 The same concept paper stresses the need to link these activities
to creating desired effects in the human domain.29 Understanding how
mechanisms are related to effects is not only academically useful, but also
operationally relevant to the human domain.
Conversion/Co-optation and Effects
When opposition political groups support a resistance movement, the latter
typically gains legitimacy quickly. This legitimacy can also be used to gain
support from the population. For the movement, this is perhaps the quickest
path to leveraging existing groups to elevate its political appeal. As Robert
Helvey demonstrates, conversion is a powerful mechanism to transform
potential political fractures into resistance.30 He notes that the Serbian
opposition movement was able to oust Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, even
though the regime possessed much more powerful coercive means, because
some of the Serbian police and bureaucrats withdrew their loyalty.31 In
essence, regime sympathizers were converted to support the opposition
movement.
Conversion is the process by which the movement signals to the pillars of
regime support that they will be disenfranchised by the movement.32 The
movement will work with some regime elements to either facilitate or stabilize
the eventual transfer of political authority. This is a different way to establish

Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University,
2005, p.137.
28 Operating in the Human Domain, Version 1.0, United States Special Operations
Command, Tampa, Florida, August, 2015, p. 38.
29 Ibid.
30 Robert L. Helevey, On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the
Fundamentals, Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard University, 2004.
31 Ibid., pp. 26-8.
32 Ibid.
27
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auxiliary and underground networks for resistance. Instead of creating
purpose-built networks from elements outside of the ruling coalition, the logic
of conversion would prescribe identifying moderate or disgruntled factions
within the power structures of the regime. Resistance can be considered as a
zero-sum political game where one defection or acquiescence means a twofold
gain for the movement and a twofold loss to the regime. From this perspective
the benefits of conversion become clear compared to those of building
external resistance networks to match the regime’s coercive capacity.
However, internal conversion and external network building are not mutually
exclusive mechanisms. Rather, they should be considered complimentary
processes designed to leverage political fractures. Conversion can also be used
in the steady state. A political claim made by the resistance movement can
gain popular support if an existing political party or influential dissidents also
endorse it. The interests of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in
Lebanese politics are often advanced in this way by Hezbollah, thus achieving
a synthesis between strategic resistance networks and smaller operational
networks.
Chenoweth and Stephen also confirm this relationship with their qualitative
and statistical analysis of regime-change campaigns.33 While civil resistance
methods are statistically correlated with successful resistance movements, the
likelihood of such success is heavily influenced by the magnitude of
defectors.34 Several causal mechanisms warrant further explanation. First,
regime defectors can greatly enhance the perceived viability of the resistance
movement. In 1986, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of
Staff Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos in the Philippine Army used the
Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) to support the political
opposition movement in the Philippines.35 With the Catholic Church’s
backing and Aquino’s street demonstrations gaining momentum, the RAM
proved to be a key element of the movement’s success.36
Second, regime defectors can deliver critical intelligence to the movement.
Such intelligence can be utilized to send surgical signals to other fence-sitters
that the movement poses no threat to them or siding with the regime will
Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic
of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011.
34 Ibid., pp. 48-51.
35 Felipe B. Miranda ed, Democratization: Philippine Perspectives, University of the
Philippines Press, 1998, p. 34-35.
36 Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1995, pp. 133-9.
33
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harm their future position. Defection can also be subtle and nonphysical.
Endorsements from existing political groups can be powerful catalysts as well.
Third, regime defectors typically can bring subordinates and equipment to the
movement, which tend to be resource-poor, especially in the beginning. In the
steady state, existing political groups can provide wider access to the
movement with their communication platforms and constituency networks.
In short, conversion is a critical mechanism to consider given how resource
intensive it can be to build an effective resistance movement that can
withstand the regime’s superior coercive power from scratch.
Growing evidence suggests that conversion was one of the main mechanisms
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used to expand both in Syria
and Iraq. In Iraq, Lina Khatib demonstrates how ISIL co-opted existing Sunni
tribes to accelerate its expansion.37 The rapid fall of Mosul can be partially
explained by conversion in that Sunni police and soldiers had little reason to
fight due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki’s systemic persecution of the
Sunni population. ISIL continued to make local alliances to accelerate its pace
of expansion. In Syria, ISIL essentially rehired civil servants and teachers to
maintain control of areas under their control as long as they agreed to use
ISIL’s ideology.38
To summarize, the effect of conversion can be profound. It can establish
broad political legitimacy for the resistance movement. It can help the
movement leverage or pool resources with existing organic institutions to
accelerate its pace of growth. Most importantly, it can help the resistance
movement become very hard for the regime to repress as such oppression is
more likely to trigger a political backlash. This is what Gene Sharp calls
“political Jiu-jitsu,” which he defines as a process through which violent
repression is exploited to elevate the legitimacy of resistance and thus garner
popular support.39
Resource-Generation and Effects
Resistance is not cheap. It requires a wide variety of activities to gain popular
support and maintain access to the population. These activities include
information campaigns, publications, public demonstrations, and cultural
Lina Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding, Carnegie Middle
East Center, June 2015, pp. 6-11.
38 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
39 Gene Sharp, How Nonviolent Struggle Works, Albert Einstein Institution, Harvard
University, 2013, pp. 112-5.
37
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and educational events, to name just a few. Self-sufficiency is, therefore, a
critical requirement for any resistance movement. State actors can easily use
official and financial means to starve dissident groups. Audits are frequently
used to suppress dissident groups of financial resources. It is no surprise that
robust resistance movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah sustain
themselves with a variety of legal and illegal financial and commercial
enterprises.
It is convenient to think that external actors can greatly help the movement by
providing the required resources to finance various activities. However, there
is a big caveat: the success of resistance largely depends on its perceived
legitimacy. No matter how secretive external support can be, just a single
exposure can completely rob the movement of authenticity and legitimacy—
this single point of failure is something the planner should be very careful
about.
Successful resistance movements generally develop their own internal
mechanisms to generate resources in order to avoid being perceived as a
puppet of outside influence. Otpor, a Serbian resistance movement, is famous
for using creative ways of generating its own resources, such as street games
mocking then Serbian president Milosevic. Other movements also employ
fund-raising events. Memorial services are a good example of events used by a
wide variety of resistance movements. Setting up charities that accept
donations from international actors is another example. Another mechanism
is nesting the movement within existing groups that have built-in
mechanisms of collecting and distributing membership fees for services.
However, these movements use the resources to develop self-sustaining
platforms instead of just focusing on acquiring kinetic capabilities. One of the
first activities of Hezbollah was collecting trash, and since then, it has
established diverse new social institutions, ranging from schools to hospitals.
The tree army in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, is another example of a
dissident group with humble beginnings. It started as an agricultural
development project led by the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell
(NRCC), working under Task Force Mountain Warrior (TFMW), and it
quickly became a self-sustaining resistance movement against the Taliban.40
Key to its success was the NRCC’s emphasis on imparting economic skills and
Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber
Exploitation and Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Afghanistan: A
Case Study Describing the Nexus Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Communities
Within the Forest Sector, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013.
40
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codes of honor to Afghan partners, which in turn propped up the perceived
legitimacy and viability of the movement.41 Trainees were recruited only from
respected families. And by working with one of the best agricultural
departments in Afghanistan, the partners managed to provide essential skills
and services to their home villages. Once the tree army was sufficiently
developed, its network was able to drive insurgents out of the area by
establishing itself as a legitimate resistance movement against the insurgency
and taking over timbering from the Taliban. Illegal timbering and smuggling
lumber was one of the most profitable illegal activities financing the Taliban
in Kunar Province.42 By far, the tree army remains one of the most successful
and self-sustaining resistance movements supported by the U.S. against the
Taliban.
Bloc Recruitment, Mass Mobilization, and Effects
Mass mobilization mechanisms for resistance differ from individual
recruitment. The pace of growth and the scale of growth must be achieved
concurrently as weak movements can be easily controlled or even co-opted by
the regime. This is why successful movements have empirically employed a
specific mobilization mechanism called bloc recruitment. Individual
recruitment and bloc recruitment are not mutually exclusive. The argument of
this article is to complement existing mechanisms with historically
reoccurring patterns of successful resistance movements.
Brokers who organically connect structurally disjointed groups in order to
facilitate bloc recruitment play an irreplaceable role. Shin-Kap Hand provides
a detailed account of how the American revolutionaries overcame internal
stratification against the British Empire.43 Paul Revere and Joseph Warren
were not in leadership positions, but they provided the critical connective
tissue between the thinkers and the doers of the American Revolution.44
Similarly, single members of the National Socialist German Workers' Party
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) in the 1920s and
Harry R. Bader, Clint Hanna, Clint Douglas, & John D. Fox, “Illegal Timber
Exploitation and Counterinsurgency Operations in Kumar Province of Afghanistan: A
Case Study Describing the Nexus Among Insurgents, Criminal Cartels, and Communities
Within the Forest Sector, Journal of Sustainable Forestry, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2013, pp. 3478. Specifically, the NRCC ensured the Afghan partners had the following qualities: desire
to protect the local community from alien influences, theocratic motivations, and
obligation due to some prior association based on family, group, or individual.
42 Ibid., pp. 333-4.
43 Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of
the American Revolution,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2,
2009.
44 Ibid.
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1930s were instrumental to the rapid expansion of the movement.45 The
primary function of the single members was to identify key influencers in
existing networks and organizations in order to bring them under the NSDAP
in a wholesale fashion. In other words, they were mobile brokers focusing on
bloc recruitment.
A similar pattern of network development was observed in Poland in the
1970s and 1980s. Early members of Polish anti-communist opposition
realized that isolated student activism was not sufficient to challenge the
communist regime. Their resistance was well organized but quickly
suppressed by the regime’s divide and conquer tactics as students were
framed as over-privileged troublemakers. Realizing this failure, Adam
Michnik established civic organizations such as the Workers Defense
Committee in Poland (Komitet Obrony Robotnikkow, KOR) and the Society
of Scientific Studies (Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych, TKN) in order to
connect Solidarity with other clusters of resistance that did not necessarily
align with each other.46 KOR was not an overtly political organization. Its
mission was to provide legal assistance and support for jailed demonstrators
and their families.47 TKN was a mobile educational program. In practice, it
was called the Flying University where academics and cultural figures
organized dispersed events to discuss sensitive topics such as Polish national
literature.48

Marryjane Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in
the Polish People’s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks, Oxford University
Press, 2003, p. 92.
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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 96.
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Figure 2: Polish Opposition Network, 1980/198149
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The perceived neutrality of civil brokers was perhaps the single most
important organizational innovation that key leaders engineered through trial
and error. Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik learned in the 1970s that focused
yet unconnected resistance could be easily neutralized by the regime’s divide
and conquer strategy. The success of Solidarity in the 1980s in replacing the
Polish communist regime cannot be explained without taking into account the
role of civic networks specifically founded to coordinate and manage a broad
coalition of dissident and existing subgroups. In other words, the notion of
solidarity was built into the overall resistance landscape.
Similar dynamics were also observed in Italy during the formation of
clandestine political militancy in the 1970s. Donatella della Porta
meticulously shows that most dedicated members of the Red Brigades, the
Proletarian Armed Groups, the Front Line, the Communist Fighting
Formations, and a few other minor clandestine groups came from existing
political groups and associations through interpersonal ties.50 What della
Porta empirically shows is that overt networks and affiliations play the role of
Ibid., p. 99.
Donatella della Portan, “Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations:
Italian Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1, JAI Press,
1988.
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a large pool composed of potential recruits who can be mobilized through
existing and multiple personal ties into a more selective and cohesive
subgroup. The magnitude of trust-based ties built and sustained in routine
overt political organizations predicts the level of commitment expressed by
those who joined the underground militant groups.51
In sum, the United States must learn how to identify and assess the potential
of organic brokers in order to facilitate bloc recruitment. Learning about
relational dynamics among and across existing networks is critical and is not
a trivial matter. Relational information is qualitatively different from
individual attributes in that the latter are used to recruit individuals, while the
former informs the planner about how heterogeneous groups and networks
converge or diverge along different political issues. Understanding those fault
lines can be a critical factor in expanding the scope of mobilization.
Framing, Messaging, and Effects
Perhaps the most effective mechanism to achieve a rapid rate of bloc
recruitment is strategic framing. Strategic framing is the process by which the
movement combines grievances with political arguments regarding three
frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Instead of merely
reproducing existing individual grievances, strategic framing provides
interpretive schemes designed to induce a shared conciousness for collective
action. In fact, SOCOM stresses the need to understand and adopt culturally
relevant messaging themes in order to localize information operations.52 If
political or economic dissatisfaction is the ingredient of collective action, then
strategic framing is the catalyst. Snow and Benford provide four specific
mechanisms of this alignment process: bridging, amplification, extension,
and transformation.53
Frame bridging is how individual conditions are bridged to a structural
issue.54 For instance, while personal poverty may be a common economic
condition, it can bridge to regime incompetence, corruption, or nepotism. The
youth bulge that was exacerbated by the global recession was blamed on the
corrupt and nepotistic regimes in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. In
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many ways, the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Buazizi
captured and collectivized a widespread individual grievance of economic
inequality. It was not an isolated incident, but was framed as a symptom of
deep-seeded structural issues affecting many like Buazizi.
Frame amplification is the technique designed to imbue the bridging frame
with an active sense of agency by invoking resonating social or religious
norms.55 For instance, it can be framed that college graduates are underemployed or unemployed not because of a structural economic strain, but
because the regime is actively skimming the benefits of national resources. It
is well documented that ISIL and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq consistently
used targeted violence to amplify the latent sectarian tension between Sunni
and Shia populations.56 By accentuating and exacerbating the divide, ISIL has
sought to mobilize and recruit disenfranchised Iraqi Sunnis.57 Returning to
the Arab Spring, the death of Buazizi in Tunisia and the murder of Khaled
Said in Egypt were quickly amplified as state-sponsored campaigns of
unbridled violence against the population.58 Incidents of violence were
quickly utilized by existing movement networks in what Wendy Pearlman
calls “microfoundations of uprising.”59 These incidents were reframed as
moral judgments invoking the violation of shared norms, dignity, and life.
Vilification is a common technique used for frame amplification.60 Vilification
has two processes. First, it begins with a polarization process where
competitors are lumped into a generic “other” category. Second, the “other”
category is repeatedly associated with socially and culturally negative traits. 61
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In frame extension the normative judgment established with the
amplification process is extended to various groups within the population.62
That is, because the regime is actively defrauding the national economy for
personal greed and to satisfy its “oligarchy,” it is not only college graduates
but also the entire middle class that are suffering from poor economic
conditions. In Tunisia, labor movements quickly seized the moment and
organized nation-wide demonstrations showing solidarity. In Egypt, what
started as an urban-based anti-Mubarak voice quickly became a national
narrative about Egyptian national pride. By this process the claim of one
group is extended to represent a broader set of social groups.
Frame transformation is the process of revitalizing a perhaps stagnating
ideology. An anti-regime narrative may need to be revamped in order to earn
international support or recognition. Typically, the movement may invoke a
“far enemy” to justify the need to work with external actors. It is no
coincidence that Solidarity’s narrative aligned the Polish communist regime
with the Soviet Union, just like Zawahiri went from the near enemy of the
Egyptian state to the Far Enemy of the West. Perhaps this is where the Arab
Spring failed to take advantage of the opening political opportunity of
elections. The secular camps within the overall opposition coalition were not
as well organized as the Muslim Brotherhood, thus failing to transform their
“opposition narrative” to a “political narrative.”
These are just a set of a few mechanisms typically employed by movements to
transform individual grievances into a powerful ideology of political
mobilization.63 Once a narrative is developed by codifying and disseminating
it through print or online media, these mechanisms can sustain the
movement very effectively. Even the current narrative of ISIL can be
described in a similar fashion. While the genesis of ISIL is uniquely Iraqi
Sunni, its information operations have adopted the narrative of the far enemy
and vilification of the West to justify why foreigners should do whatever it
takes to join the Caliphate and mobilize themselves to commit lone-wolf
attacks on civilian targets.
External support can play a critical role in enhancing the movement’s
strategic framing. Recent research on the Arab Spring clearly indicates that
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external media outlets can create an echo effect to elevate the salience of
certain political themes and frames.64 Even if the regime shuts down social
media or even the Internet, external communication and dissemination
outside the country corresponds to elevated popular interest and support for
resistance. In fact, this was not unique to the Arab Spring. Keck’s and
Sikkink’s extensive case studies of transnational movements demonstrate how
a political claim travels outside, amplified by external media outlets or
epistemic communities, and then reenters the country of origin to empower
the movement.65 They call this pattern of resistance growth the “boomerang”
effect.66 Applied to resistance, an external supporter can surgically guide this
well-established pattern to enhance the perceived viability of an organic
opposition movement.

Conclusion
This article identifies critical conditions, mechanisms, and effects that can be
utilized for supporting resistance movements. However, one environmental
factor deserves additional attention. Given the definitions discussed earlier, it
should be clear that modern resistance often takes place in politically austere
environments. This means sponsoring resistance should factor in substantial
measures of regime repression. Thus, it is necessary to examine some of the
typical obstacles to sustained collective action in order to identify what traits
to look for when looking for resistance movements to sponsor.
A resistance movement challenging the government or occupying force is
most likely to face a multitude of repressive efforts. Figure 3 represents a
simple typology of state repression. While state repression can be categorized
in multiple ways, typically it can be conceptualized by two factors: scope of
repression and method of repression. Vertically it ranges from kinetic to nonkinetic and, laterally, it ranges from collective to individual. Four types of
repression are commonly used against opposition movements: leadership
targeting, leadership cooptation, resource control, and delegitimation.67 This
typology should work as a check list for planners to factor in what types of

Sean Aday & et al, “New Media and Conflict after the Arab Spring,” United States
Institute of Peace, 2012.
65 Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders, Cornell University
Press, 1998.
66 Ibid., p. 36.
67 See Jennifer Earl for a detailed discussion on repression. Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear
Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 21,
No. 1, 2003.
64

60
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 4

support organic resistance movements would need in order to withstand
regime repression and survive.
When a resistance movement or insurgency challenges a regime, the latter
will first try to remove the leaders by arresting or killing them. However,
decapitation rarely leads to organizational collapse of insurgent or terrorist
movements.68 When leadership targeting is not sufficient or successful, the
regime will often employ resource control measures to starve the
challengers.69 These include shutting down social institutions, audits, and
financial sanctions. In addition, regimes will often try to divide and disrupt
movements through nonlethal means. Such efforts include cooptation,
infiltration, reintegration promises, and selective incentives.
If a resistance movement is to succeed in coercing or disrupting its targeted
regime, it becomes critical for the former to have organic capabilities that can
be utilized to withstand and overcome state repression. Historically,
movements typically acquire these capabilities by employing various nonkinetic and nonviolent activities such as providing essential services and
organizing public events to garner popular support.70 This is why this article
highlights the processes used by insurgents to develop organic political
support, resource independence, organizational resiliency, and ideological
legitimacy. These processes can be found across different environments
ranging from East and Central Asia to the Middle East.71 This resiliency often
stems from a coalition of multiple networks. This multiplicity may carry an
operational liability. However, it is the same factors that give resistance a
diffused and broad “attribution” characteristic: repression on one is an attack
on everyone. Social movement theory calls this mechanism the “repression
backfire.”72
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Figure 3: Simplified Typology of Repression
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The regime will typically have more coercive capacity than the resistance
movement. It is common to think that lethal aid is what resistance needs to
compete with the regime’s military and security forces. Lethal aid may prove
effective against weakened or fragile regimes, but not against mature
autocratic regimes such as North Korea, China, Iran, or Russia. Lethal
assistance also carries a hefty political price.
Social movement literature suggests that what enables the movement to
compete effectively against the regime is not how well it fights with brute
force, which is typically expressed as guerilla warfare. Rather, it is the
political, economic, social, and ideological foundations built during the steady
state that enable the movement to deflect regime repression and turn it into a
rallying point.73 Resistance movements succeed when they can strategically
employ both lethal and nonlethal methods instead of relying on a single
strategy. When resistance movements are not balanced, they often lead to
undesirable strategic consequences, such as was the case of the Nicaraguan
Contras, where neither the surrogates nor the sponsor achieved their
respective objective.74 If resistance is to be employed as a strategic tool for
Paul K. Davis & et al, Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency
and Terrorism, RAND Corporation, 2012.
74 For a detailed account about the Contras and its both local and regional consequences,
see Stephen Kinzer, Blood of Brothers, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American
Studies, Harvard University, 1991.
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advancing national security goals, the United States must carefully factor in
the intricate dynamics between conditions, mechanisms, and effects. Tactics
of guerilla warfare are no longer sufficient to inform us how to harness the
strategic nature of resistance.
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